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ABSTRACT. The concept of digital immortality has emerged over the past decade and is 
defined here as the continuation of an active or passive digital presence after death. 
Advances in knowledge management, machine to machine communication, data mining 
and artificial intelligence are now making a more active presence after death possible. This 
paper examines the research and literature around active digital immortality and explores 
the emotional, social, financial, and business impact of active digital immortality on 
relations, friends, colleagues and institutions. The issue of digital immortality also raises 
issues about the legal implications of a possible autonomous presence that reaches beyond 
mortal existence, and this will also be investigated. The final section of the paper questions 
whether digital immortality is really a concern and reflects on the assumptions about it in 
relation to neoliberal capitalism. It suggests that digital immortality may in fact merely be a 
clever ruse which in fact is likely to have little, if any legal impact despite media 
assumptions and hyperbole. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The concept of digital immortality has emerged over the past decade and it has 
gained increasing interest and media attention. Digital immortality is defined here 
as the continuation of an active or passive digital presence after death. As people 
establish on-line identities and repositories, the likelihood that their digital 
presences will persist beyond their death increases, especially as the use of virtual 
personal assistants grows. This paper will examine the research and literature 
around active digital immortality and consider, for example, how an active 
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artificial intelligence driven presence after death (two-way immortality) differs 
from ‘passive’ social media death (one-way immortality). The emotional, social, 
financial, and business impact of active digital immortality on relations, friends, 
colleagues and institutions will be explored, as will preservation and privacy 
issues, and the legal implications of a presence on-going beyond the autonomous 
control of the mortal presence. Questions such as who would assume liability for 
libellous material, or other infringements, will also be examined.  
The scope of a digitally immortal persona will be restricted in this paper to 
include only that which is currently technically feasible, rather than any form of 
speculative digital downloading of consciousness or physical androids. The focus 
is therefore on current developments in artificial intelligence and purely digital 
personas based on the ‘mindfiles’ of a person – the digital traces of a person’s 
active, living relationship with technology, a digital database of people’s thoughts, 
memories, feelings and opinions, such as CyberAll, (Gehl, 2001), and where, 
according to Bell and Gray (2001:29), ‘one’s experiences are digitally preserved 
and which then take on a life of their own.’  
The paper will consider the legislative conundrums of pre and post death and 
the scope for legislation and guidance, for example how the law should deal with 
any ensuing contracts and the legal framework for post-death presence, as well as 
legal deletion and legal protection. In the absence of a living, and identified actor, 
and without clear authority for virtual activity beyond death, mechanisms for 
pursuing liability in civil and criminal liability within a global jurisdiction is 
unclear. Yet the paper questions whether digital immortality is really a concern or 
merely a clever ruse which in fact is likely to have little, if any legal impact. 
However, the paper will begin with an exploration of the current research and 
literature in this area. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Despite the media interest in digital immortality, the research in this area remains 
small and discrete. However, digital immortality has moved beyond simple 
memorial pages (Frost 2014), and as early as 1997 the term thanatechnology was 
instituted by Sofka (1997) to represent this desire to preserves one’s soul and assets 
digitally after death; it has since been developed further by Sofka, and Gilbert 
(2012). There have also been cases where people have received ‘beyond the grave’ 
updates, either from dead friends (McAlear, 2011), or companies dedicated to 
creating digitally immortal personas (LivesOn, 2015). Facebook has now put in 
place measures to control the digital legacy of pages on their site (Skelton, 2012; 
Buck, 2013), and recent work by authors such as Adali and Golbeck (2014) 
illustrate that it is possible to generate accurate predictions of personality from 
online traces. Advances in data mining and artificial intelligence are now making a 
more active presence after death possible; thus it would seem to be possible to 
create artificially intelligent systems that could generate new commentary on media 
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events in the style of a particular deceased person, for whom an online profile had 
been created before death. The first section of the literature review explores 
identity and the shifts in the way it has been perceived, since this has a bearing on 
digital immortality, which in essence is a left behind identity.  
 
Shifting identities  
In former years identity and self have been seen as static entities. Whilst authors 
such as Buber (1964) argue for the notion of selfhood rather than identity, there 
remain questions to be answered about the extent to which identity shifts, as well 
as role shifts, are more likely to occur in some environments than others. Further 
Lukes (1973) argued for the ethic of individualism which suggests the idea of the 
individual being independent and autonomous, and one’s thoughts and actions not 
being determined by external agencies. However, Hall has argued: 
 
 . . . identity does not signal that stable core of the self, unfolding from 
beginning to end through all the vicissitudes of history without change... 
Nor – if we translate this essentialising conception to the stage of cultural 
identity – is it that collective or true self hiding inside the many other, 
more superficial or artificially imposed ‘selves’... identities are never 
unified, and in late modern times, increasingly fragmented; never 
singular, but multiply constructed across different... discourses, practices 
and positions. (1996: 3–4) 
 
More recently Haraway (1985) and Hayles (1999) have been at the forefront of 
discussions about identity in digital spaces, and Ito et al (2010) have been 
influential in the work that has examined how youth culture and identity might be 
understood. Thus, since a raft of sociologists have examined identity, there is a 
broad literature on identity. Turkle (2005) suggests that computers are not merely 
objects that make our lives more efficient, but are subjects that are intimately and 
ultimately linked to our social and emotional lives. The result then is that 
computers change not only what we do, but also how we think about the world and 
ourselves. Such suggestions would seem to be exemplified in perspectives on and 
studies into virtual reality and immersion (for example Žižek, 2005; Hayles, 1999), 
as well as in studies about identity positions in virtual worlds. However, Clark has 
argued: 
 
Human-machine symbiosis, I believe, is simply what comes naturally. It 
lies on a direct continuum with clothes, cooking ("external, artificial 
digestion"), bricklaying, and writing. The capacity to creatively distribute 
labor across biology and the designed environment is the very signature 
of our species, and it implies no real loss of control on our part. For who 
we are is in large part a function of the webs of surrounding structure in 
which the conscious mind exercises at best a kind of gentle indirect 
control. (Clark, 2003: 174) 
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It is argued here that what is needed instead is not a static view of self but a liquid 
view; a recognition that identities are not just multiple and fluid, but overlap and 
shift according to context.  
The idea of being able to live on beyond your natural death has a long history in 
our culture, and remains popular in novels such as The Night's Dawn Trilogy by 
Peter Hamilton (Hamilton, 1996-1999). Prior to our technological age the agency 
for this was typically the ghost, and in the 20th Century we have seen examples 
from Randall and Hopkirk (Deceased) (Spooner, 1969) to Ghost (Rubin, 1990) and 
Truly, Madly, Deeply (Minghella, 1990). However, in the digital era, most of the 
Artificial Intelligences within Science Fiction have tended to be “evolved” artificial 
intelligences, such as SkyNet in Terminator and Ultron in the Marvel films, which 
have become sentient rather than being created as digital immortal personas of 
other people. However, there are examples, particularly in the science fiction of the 
last decade, where the artificial intelligences are digital immortals, or at least are 
the digital copies of real people. Examples include Caprica (the Battlestar Galactica 
prequel, where Zoe Greystone has been creating a copy of herself, but she then dies 
leaving the digital copy to carry on her legacy), BBC’s Planet B series (where the 
protagonist attempts to find his girlfriend who is dead in the real world but alive in 
the Planet B virtual world, with the help of a rogue avatar who has no human 
controller) and the Gleisner robots (human digital intelligences downloaded into 
physical robots) of Greg Egan’s Diaspora (Egan, 1997). What is interesting about 
these constructions is that the digital persona is very much living in the here and 
now of their progenitor’s death, rather than facing up to the implications of 
potential immortality. 
The novels of Suarez (2009) depict something akin to digital immortality, in 
that the character Sobol was dying of brain cancer and become fearful for the 
human race and humanity, and began to envision a new world order. Thus on the 
publication of the obituary of Sobol, a brilliant computer programmer, a computer 
Daemon is activated, designed to enact this new world order. There are also 
constructions of left behind identities; some examples of this include films from 
popular culture such as X-Men (Hayter, 2000) and The Matrix (Wachowski, and 
Wachowski (1999). Certainly Žižek (1999), in his deconstruction of The Matrix, 
suggests the possibility that the deletion of our digital identities could turn us into 
‘non-persons’, but perhaps a more accurate idea would be one of becoming 
changelings, rather than deletions. Although largely seen as a legendary creature 
left behind instead of a human child, the changeling has also been used to 
demonstrate different forms of ‘left-behind’ identities. Possibly the most well-
known example is the changeling boy in A Midsummer Night’s Dream over whom 
Oberon and Titania fight (Shakespeare, 1590), who exists at the borderlands of 
human and fairy kind. The play itself explores issues at the margins of where 
power and rules change and often break down; something that clearly seems to be 
the case in digital immortality. Furthermore, there has been little consideration of 
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the spaces where these identities are located and the little exploration of different 
identity constructions. 
 
Space and identities  
This section examines research undertaken into identity in cyberspace, and 
suggests ways in which identities might be delineated in difference spaces, in order 
to provide a backdrop to the exploration of identities beyond the grave.  
For most people there is a sense of travelling through cyberspace by putting on 
and taking off identities, crossing fluctuating boundaries and bouncing between 
virtual and real life worlds, and this brings opportunities to ‘play away’ from other 
identities. The work of Goffman is still useful in informing explorations of identity 
in digital spaces, as he argues that people tend to construct and perform their 
identities in relation to their peers and networks (Goffman, 1959). Further, studies 
into Second Life indicate that staff and students recognise that online identities 
tend to spill over into work or home identities, and in some cases have prompted 
reformulations of other identities in other worlds (Steils et al., 2014). Some 
scholars suggest that it is important to have a clear conceptual understanding of 
who we are in cyberspace, since without it we risk being confused (for example 
Floridi, 2011). Floridi and others who argue for such a stance seem to suggest that 
separating and being honest about identities brings with it some kind of honesty or 
morality, yet this would seem misplaced. Similarly, Kimmons and Veletsianos 
(2014) argue that the ability to undertake identity explorations relies on the “user’s 
ability to separate the legion of one’s virtual, exploratory selves from the real life 
or traditionally viewed unitary self. In the Web 2.0 world, however, one’s ability to 
do this diminishes as anonymity declines, real life connections are replicated in the 
virtual medium, web resources are used for surveillance, and sites like Facebook 
and LinkedIn seek to present “authentic,” unitary selves that are similar to the 
selves expressed in real life.” (Kimmons and Veletsianos, 2014: 8) 
Nevertheless, this stance would seem erroneous, since identity exploration does 
not require a clear separation of identities, but a recognition that identities are both 
multiple and fluid, and overlap and shift according to context. Although later in the 
article Kimmons and Veletsianos do suggest context has some relevance, they do 
rather hold onto the argument for some kind of unitary self. For example, they 
argue that Facebook is built on the premise that people have authentic identities 
and that those identities are expressed online, yet work by Madge et al suggests 
that while the use of Facebook can support student engagement and integration at 
University, students still largely use it as a social tool. They observe students 
adopting a wide variety of ‘different place-based and online-networks to develop 
and sustain their settling-in process and maintain and develop social networks’ 
(Madge et al., 2009: 152). Further, Kimmons and Veletsianos also argue that online 
identities are mere fragments of themselves and that people tend neither to play a 
part nor act out identities. Yet this sense of just using what they term acceptable 
identity fragments would seem to suggest that people merely use online splinters of 
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themselves, rather than make specific decisions and choices about what is revealed, 
acted, dramatized and performed. Perhaps a more useful concept is identity 
tourism, a metaphor developed by Nakamura (2000) to portray identity 
appropriation in cyberspace. The advantage of such appropriation enables the 
possibility of playing with different identities without encountering the risk 
associated with racial differences in real life. Yet: “One of the dangers of identity 
tourism is that it takes this restriction across the axes of race/class in the ‘real 
world’ to an even more subtle and complex degree by reducing non white identity 
positions to part of a costume or masquerade to be used by curious vacationers in 
cyberspace.” (Nakamura, 2000) 
Identities tend to be played out differently according to the diverse online 
groups it is possible engage with; we are all enactors of our own spatial stories 
which may or may not be adapted or adopted by others after death. Identities, then, 
can be delineated as multiple and multifaceted and have been described in detail by 
Savin-Baden (2015); some of these are summarised below: 
 
Spatial identities – there are many mobile and polyvalent identities that are played 
out by individuals in diverse media spaces, whether Twitter, Facebook, blogs or 
email. Largely there will be some degree of crossover between them, and some 
kind of stability, even though we might choose to represent ourselves differently on 
Facebook compared with a work email conversation. These identities are enacted 
through digital media and each enactment tends to prompt a different kind of 
performance, invariably guided by the norms, cultures and affordances of both the 
software and the users of those spaces. These identities are at most risk of digital 
immortality.  
 
Networked identities – in 2008 Ryberg and Larsen suggested that networked 
identities represented the idea that identities were constructed in multidimensional 
and complex ways across overlapping online and off line networks across school, 
work and spare time, and it is through such networks that individual identities exist 
and become real. Since 2008 further research seems to support this, but also 
indicates the emergence of visibility and status hierarchies within such networks. 
For example, Kozinets (2010) suggested this was less about status per se and more 
about ‘visibility and identity expressions’ (p. 24). Networked identities differ from 
spatial identities as they are specifically located in, and are in relation to, given 
networks, rather than broader spatial zones in which spatial identities are located, 
although of course there is overlap between the two.  
 
Identities on tour – there is often a sense of play with these kinds of identities. 
These are not static, and do not have anything sinister about them, as in identity 
tourism. Instead they are dynamic, and the purpose and point of view of the 
traveller is central. Thus when working in areas such as mixed and augmented 
reality, people might create legitimate space and places for identity exploration and 
(re)formation. 
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Bridged identities – are identities created to link with other exterior worlds, such as 
virtual worlds, discussion forums and gaming worlds. Such identities might be 
located through the creation of avatars or using avatars for identity play (playing 
with avatar identity in ways that were seen as fun and sometimes trite (Savin-
Baden, 2010). Thus bridged identities link to other (alien) identities, such as other 
territories and no-man’s land. For example, the bodily markers that are used to 
present ourselves in life, clothes, ethnicity, gender and speech may be re-presented 
(differently) in virtual worlds but they also indicate choices about how we wish to 
be seen or the ways in which we might like to feel differently. However, as 
Nakamura suggests, we might be aware that these kinds of media (games and 
virtual embodiment) create social factions of race and gender, while accurate 
images of gender and cultural realties might be rare (Nakamura, 2010: 430). 
 
Discarded identities - As we shift and move identities across online contexts, rather 
than deleting those that become superfluous, we tend to leave them behind. Such 
identities then become part of the junk spaces of the Internet, left behind and 
forgotten avatars, discarded blogs or Facebook profiles, along with the ones that 
remain when someone dies. 
 
Playing at the borders of identity seems to be an attempt to disrupt the mind/body 
polarity by focussing on a resituated and often repositioned body. Perhaps it is 
more complex and we need to have a new set of sp/pl/ace identities which reflect 
squashed polarities, misplaced immortalities and new configurations of space and 
place. Transformations are affecting our identities and sense of space and place, so 
that there is a sense of being disparate, as well as holding homogenised identities. 
Yet it is also important to consider how digital immortality is created and placed. 
 
Creating Digital Immortality? 
Despite the concern and excitement, digital immortality merely comprises code and 
data. Digital identities are data, which can be added to and updated (and even 
forgotten), and a set of code with rules (which may themselves be data) to interact 
with those data and the real world – something more than just a simple auto-
responder like a Twitterbot (Dubbin, 2013). This section explores how this code 
may then be used to interact with the real world, so that the digital immortal can 
present itself in various ways, although being only a manifestation. Further, there is 
also no reason why there should not be more than one copy of the code (and data) 
running instant digital clones. Whether these instant digital clones can share, co-
operate, or even compete is another avenue for exploration. A simple and current 
example of such a multiple bot would be the 70,000 (covert) female chatbots 
(fembots) used to “chat up” male subscribers to the Ashley Maddison dating web 
site, giving the sense of it being a busy site with large numbers of available 
women, and encouraging the men to sign up for more expensive services on the 
site (Gizmodo, 2015). 
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Figure 1 provides a simple overview of a potential digital immorality system. A 
central core manages memory, reasoning, motivation, planning and possibly 
emotion. The digital immortal “reads” a variety of information sources, and has 
two-way access to a variety of real-world systems. It can also embody itself in 
virtual worlds (as an avatar), and possibly in the physical world (via a robot). It has 
a natural language understanding and generation facility to enable two-way 
communication with people in the physical world (by text, audio, video, email, 
textchat, Twitter and other systems), and it potentially synchronises its knowledge 
and activities between multiple instances of itself.  
 
       Figure 1 An overview of a potential digital immortality system 
 
 
The most important implication of this code/data existence is that immortality is in 
fact just a hosting plan (Burden, 2012); as long as you (or your digital immortal) 
can keep paying the hosting company to run you (and keep a backup), you live. 
From a longer term perspective though there are issues about how the identity is 
“transcribed” between operating systems, media, computer languages and database 
standards, as the information technology landscape changes over time. Whilst in 
many ways these are aspects which are common to many, even all, computerised 
systems (and that in itself is part of the point – what we are discussing here is 
something built on current technology), what turns it into a Digital Immortality 
(apart from the nature of the code) is the intent (to deceive, replace, to be “self-
determined”) and the illusion that it then creates in the outside world. The 
important issue here is the need to only to create an effective illusion - and a system 
that can maintain the illusion that the interaction is either with a real person, or at 
least a consistent model of a person now dead. We do not need to create 
“consciousness” – although the difference soon gets us into the realm of the work 
of Moody, Dennett, Chalmers and Zombies (Dennett, 1995).  
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In other arenas it is not illusions that are seen to be created, but projections. For 
example, Gee’s conception of the virtual self in gaming is located within character 
within the game, and he has argued that identities are projected identities, but this 
introduces interesting psychoanalytic difficulties. Projections are usually unwanted 
feelings that people invariably choose not to own; the assumption is therefore a 
belief that someone else is thinking/feeling them instead, such as anger or 
judgement (Jung, 1977). The difficulty then with the creation of digital immortality 
is that the formation could be seen as a replicated identity, which is less than 
something that ‘exists’ externally or in the virtual world, and is merely a simulation 
running in the mind of the perceiver. For example, in forms of paranoid 
schizophrenia, some people experience Capgrass syndrome where they see 
replicated manifestations of friends, relatives or even themselves, which is an 
example what happens when a human system breaks down. 
At the most rudimentary level the digital personality is a case of 
parameterisation, rules and data. Parameters might set some of the coarse elements 
of the digital immortality, for instance an appetite for risk, or an extrovert/introvert 
personality. The rules define what the digital immortality does, or the decisions it 
makes, based on a wide variety of inputs, informed by its data, and guided by its 
parameters. Some of these rules may be very deeply ingrained (for example, to 
avoid things that might damage its survival), whereas others might be more 
ephemeral and constantly changing, for instance approaches to deciding where to 
invest. At their simplest these rules might be straightforward IF . . .THEN 
statements; at their most complex they might be implemented as “rule engines” and 
neural networks. The final element is data, which in the case of a digital immortal 
could be seen as synonymous with memory. Whilst still much under debate, 
humans are seen to have different types of memory (Tulving, 1991) but it is 
episodic memory and semantic memory that are perhaps the most helpful in the 
context of digital immortality. Thus creating digital immortality becomes “simply” 
a case of defining the parameters, defining the rules, and collecting the data. There 
are broadly two approaches for creating the code and data for a digital immortal; 
manual and automated. In a manual process the digital immortal might be created 
by explicitly having a “dialogue” with a digital immortality “wizard” over many 
days, weeks, or years. In an automated process the data would be harvested by 
tracking real-world interactions (our emails, voicemails, blog posts, global 
positioning traces, bank transactions), and the parameters and rules created by 
modelling our decisions and responses and gradually refining those models (for 
example through neural net or genetic programming approaches) until they 
accurately reflected our true actions.  
 
Scope of action and interaction 
Once digital immortality is created it is important to consider how it would interact 
with the world, and how others might interact with it; some suggestions are 
delineated below: 
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Passive Collection 
The digital immortal can collect information about the world, such as “reading” 
web sites and RSS feeds, reading emails and examining data feeds. In fact as a 
digital immortal it should inherit our email account, bookmarks and RSS feeds. 
There are already applications (e.g. Stremor and Textuality) which will extract the 
key ideas from web pages and RSS feeds, or that can identify trends and outliers in 
data. The only “data” which would currently give the digital immortality problems 
are audio and video, but speech recognition and video analytics are both 
improving.  
 
Interacting with Systems 
Interacting with systems is a superset of the passive collection case; here the digital 
immortal is able to raise queries, post data, or make changes on other computer 
systems. Most computer systems now have Application Programming Interfaces 
(API), often delivered as “web services”, which could be controlled by the digital 
immortal. Where those interfaces are encrypted or otherwise protected so that they 
can only be accessed by a dedicated client (for example, online banking) then there 
may be more of a challenge to accessing the interface, but as machine-to-machine 
(M2M) interaction increases (for example, our accounting system accessing our 
bank accounts), then the scope to access them from the digital immortal increases. 
 
Interacting with People 
Interacting with people is probably the easiest challenge. Natural language 
processing and generation systems, often called chatbots, have a long history 
(Turing, 1952). Whilst the Turing Test (a test to see if a computer can fool a human 
into thinking it’s also a human) has yet to be passed consistently, there are signs 
(Gilbert and Forney, 2015) that we are coming close. Interestingly it is the natural 
language generation that may prove a harder problem to solve than the natural 
language understanding. Another challenge is that most Turing conversations are 
little more than question-answer exchanges, whereas real human conversation is 
often more about conversational threads and argumentation.  
Whilst most chatbot work has been about text-based interfaces, text-to-speech 
generation is becoming increasingly human (and close to “Turing” capable), but 
speech recognition is still problematic (as any user of Siri or Cortana can attest). 
Real-time generation of video imagery (head only or full body) is also improving, 
and real-time understanding of gesture and expression is also on a steady 
improvement path (for instance Second Life founder Philip Rosedale’s new High 
Fidelity virtual world uses a webcam to have your avatar mimic your facial 
expressions as you talk). So whilst the most “believable” digital immortal today 
would be a recluse conversing only by email, text message and real-time chat, it is 
probably only a decade before full audio-visual interaction with our digital 
immortal will be possible and indeed the Loebner “Gold” prize has been set up to 
encourage this (http://www.loebner.net/Prizef/loebner-prize.html). 
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Interacting with the Physical World 
There are two aspects to interacting with the physical world. First, in order to 
interact with the physical world the digital immortal does not need a physical 
manifestation. Increasingly the physical world is being controlled by systems, from 
home lighting to cars. Thus if the digital immortal can access and control systems it 
can also control the system connected parts of the physical. At a macro-level if a 
neo-liberal capitalist digital immortal is controlling funds and companies its effect 
on the physical world through its human “agents” (employees) could be immense. 
Giving the digital immortal embodiment within the physical world such as an 
R2D2 type robot, a C3PO type robot, or a human-looking avatar, is almost a side-
show. Digital immortality need only capitalise on current technology. There is also 
no need for the digital immortal to “move” into the robot shell, it can control the 
shell remotely or just place a part or an instance of itself within the shell to 
maintain a level of autonomy when disconnected.  
However, perhaps an incentive to use a physical form is that embodiment may 
be essential to the development of the digital immortal’s identity, and intelligence. 
Varela et al (1991) and others have argued that embodiment is key to intelligence, 
and so it makes sense for the digital immortal to aspire to physical embodiment in 
order to experience the rich, chaotic physical world at first hand so as to avoid 
atrophy and encourage the further growth of its intelligence. This embodiment 
though could be purely within a virtual world – controlling an avatar within a 
virtual world or virtual office, and interacting with other virtual (living and 
deceased) people and employees.  
 
One way and two way immortality 
In this paper we are not concerned with futuristic ideas of how to create “artificial 
intelligences” such as methods of transferring “souls” or “thoughts” to an 
everlasting digital brain. Instead we are only considering what could be done today, 
and over the next few years. Thus in exploring digital immortality it is useful to 
think of two different categories of digital immortality: one-way immortality and 
two-way immortality. The former is typified by the Facebook memorial pages and 
other examples given earlier. It is where the deceased has a digital presence on-line 
that extends after their death, but that presence is purely “read-only”. It is possible 
to view it, read it, even get messages from it, but not to engage in a dialogue with 
it. One-way immortality can also be classified into automated, where the presence 
is just built up naturally, passively, from the lived life (such as a Facebook page or 
blog), or manual, where the deceased has actively curated a set of information to be 
preserved beyond their death. A manual/active one-way immortality would also 
include after-death messages, such as Remembered Voices and ToLovedOnes and 
paper wills. 
Two-way immortality is where there is the potential for the digital identity to 
interact with the living world. This interaction could come in a wide variety of 
ways, from 2-way text or even voice and video conversations to analysis of stock 
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market activities and buy and sell orders, as described in the interaction section 
above. What probably separates an immortal “identity” from a set of scripted rules 
is: the ability (and indeed necessity?) to change over time, the ability to engage in 
multiple modes (email, APIs, text chat), and to share information between these 
modes. These categories are summarised in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1 Categories of digital immortality  
 One-Way Immortality Scripted 
Systems 
Two-Way 
Immortality 
 Automated Manual   
Actively created/curated before 
death 
No Yes Yes/No Yes/No 
Able to show past life Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Able to pass messages immediately 
after death 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Able to respond to future events No No Yes Yes 
Able to change way responds to 
future events 
No No No Yes 
Able to share information between 
systems 
No No No Yes 
Sense of “talking” to the deceased No No No Yes 
Examples Facebook 
page 
ToLovedOnes Trading 
Rules 
?? 
 
3. Legislative Conundrums of Pre and Post Death  
 
The digital world therefore opens up an unimaginably diverse range of 
opportunities for one individual’s identity to perpetuate after the death of their real, 
human being. An existence, of some form, may continue to involve itself in social 
commentary or undertake business transactions, when the physical entity in whose 
name it purports to act is rendered nothing more than ashes. This presents some 
clear legal issues. What if, for example, the digital identity shares an opinion that 
causes offence, perhaps making allegations that a named individual is a 
paedophile? In the ‘real’ world, that individual may have cause for legal action, 
depending on where in the world they were resident, the allegation was made, and 
where it was published. These details are important; the world does not offer one 
global jurisdiction, and the laws that apply in one country (or even within different 
states) may not necessarily apply elsewhere. 
Whilst deciding within which jurisdiction to bring an action may prove 
challenging where the facts of a case are tangible – for example where an English 
visitor allegedly suffers negligence at the hands of a visiting Peruvian chiropractor 
whilst visiting the US State of Nebraska – the demands may be even more exigent 
in the virtual world. For example, the case of Al Amoudi v Brisard and Another 
(2006) considered the issue of internet publications and libel, and whether posting 
of allegedly defamatory information on the website of a Swiss company fell within 
the jurisdiction of the English court. It highlighted the complexities associated with 
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establishing ‘substantial publication’ for the purposes of an action in libel, and 
particularly in relation to publication on the internet, a ‘unique medium of 
international communication’ which necessitates the re-evaluation of the law of 
defamation (Al Amoudi v Brisard and Another 2006: para 22). These difficulties 
notwithstanding, this case rests on individuals with a real presence. What if a 
claimant were to attempt an action in libel against a virtual presence? In UK law 
defamation is a civil offence, so the claimant would be seeking to sue an entity 
purporting to be an individual that no longer exists. How might this be possible? If 
the entity was acting under the deceased’s autonomous control, for example a 
perpetuating social media presence, then the claimant may attempt to sue the dead 
persons’ estate. Even if it were possible to prove the elements of libel, the action 
would generally be subject to the statutory limitation “of one year from the date on 
which the cause of action accrued” (Limitation Act 1980 s4A (b)), and then would 
arise the question of whether there was actually an estate to sue – this will cease to 
exist once probate has settled. What liability do website operators have for 
defamatory comments they host? What if the potential action sits outside the 
jurisdiction of the English court, for example elsewhere in the EU, or in the US? 
The answers to these questions must be framed within the context of a range of 
caveats and conditions. For example, although there is generally no liability for 
defamation if the operator of a website can show that they have not posted the 
comment, this will not always provide an effective defence in English law (see for 
example, Defamation Act 2013 section 5 (1)–(3)). 
What if the actions of the virtual presence represent potential criminal liability? 
This raises the question again about the driving force behind the virtual presence; 
the dead can generally have no criminal liability, but others acting behind the 
shield of a digital presence may have. Again, determining liability will depend on a 
diverse range of factors, not least the determination of the jurisdiction in which the 
alleged criminal act took place, where its effects were experienced, and by whom. 
For example, if Mr. X assumes the identity of deceased child Y to construct a 
digital identity and then goes on to use this to drive fraudulent activity; he may face 
criminal conviction for fraud by false representation (Fraud Act 2006), with the 
fact of the child’s death acting as an aggravating factor. The digital world is 
diverse, and evolving and complex. Even where consideration is limited to social 
media, the complexity of policies surrounding governance of an individual’s 
presence post-death is great. Indeed, in a paper exploring the policies that define 
Facebook after death, McCallig (2013: 7) identifies that: “…individual users enter 
a dynamic and complex legal agreement when they operate a Facebook account. 
Even for a person with reasonable technical and legal skills, negotiating the 
provisions and policies takes considerable effort. There is no provision that 
expressly terminates the contractual agreement between Facebook and a user who 
dies. This is not exceptional.” 
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These policies will govern the storage of personal data after death (subject 
within the European Union to data protection laws), access by third parties, and the 
archiving and deleting of data. Given the intricacy of this corporate regulation, and 
the plethora of media with their own governance protocols, there must be some 
argument for initiating some consistent and accessible approach to legislation and 
governance of the post-death presence. This section has presented many questions, 
and very few answers. This is the nature of the virtual world – an ever expanding 
and evolving entity that often transcends legal and geographical boundaries. The 
law is generally used as a means of controlling and restraining malignant 
behaviours, and making punishments and attempts at reparation when harm is 
done. This is generally challenging in the ‘real world’ where the parties to an 
unlawful act are tangible and visible. The assiduous development of the virtual 
world makes this ever more exigent. (Al Amoudi v Brisard and Another [2006] 3 
All ER 294) 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Parameters, rules and data sound all very well, but will our digital immortality 
actually have “intelligence” – or to use a better phrase “sentience” – and does it 
matter if it has that or not?  
If we take neo-liberal capitalism to be ultimately about the power of the 
individual (and the control of assets exerted by the individual), then digital 
immortality could enable individuals to perpetuate their control and influence on an 
indefinite basis. There is the potential for the (unfettered) control of power, capital 
and the means of production, by creating a digital immortal beyond the grave, 
running their corporations way off into the future – think what Warren Buffet (or 
conversely Donald Trump) might achieve if he were to become immortal.  
Whilst rules, and indeed quite complex rules, will give the illusion of rational 
decision making what we need is not just decision making but “reasoning”; the 
ability to address a problem having complex inputs and grey areas, with the 
application of a coherent decision making process. Relatively simple seeming 
human questions or decisions, whether with a financial or emotional impact, can be 
very hard for a computer to try and unpick, but this has to be the challenge, and 
will add significantly to the illusion of the digital immortal possessing intelligence. 
However, just being able to reason here and now is not enough. The digital 
immortal needs to be able to evolve its reasoning processes, and indeed its whole 
code, data and interface to keep up with the changes in the world around it. At the 
most trivial level the computer languages, hardware and communications systems 
on which the web is based on did not exist 30 years ago. NASA probes are 
designed to work for a decade plus, but they have a very fixed environment. How 
does the digital immortality system manage this evolution? How do we move from 
what might give us 10–20 years of digital longevity to an infinite span of digital 
immortality? Whilst the temptation is to think of a fix for this in technical terms 
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(and that is no doubt the long term goal), in the shorter term we may be better 
considering the fix as being a business/social one. However, less within the control 
of the digital immortal would be its risk from hacking, and particularly from an 
“insider-threat”. A digital immortal (and/or its creator) is likely to put in a variety 
of measures to protect against this: 
• Multiple copies and high levels of redundancy 
• A modular, federated structure to minimise any damage 
• Back-up copies  
• High levels of firewalls and anti-virus software. Monitoring and defences 
• High levels of user authentication for those with privileged access to the digital 
immortality 
• High levels of integrity/consistency checking to ensure that no code or data has 
become corrupted. 
 
If the digital immortal is in control of assets (wealth, people, companies) then there 
is nothing to stop it ensuring that there is a long term strategy for its evolution in 
place, and people paid, motivated (and obliged?) to ensure that the digital 
immortality is kept current in terms of technology and interfaces. A “clever” digital 
immortality may indeed run several such programmes, and hide the true nature of 
some or all of those programmes from the workers. Not a Machiavellian artificial 
intelligence, just a well-planned and programmed digital immortal. Situated in the 
context of higher education this could also sustain what is currently a pernicious 
ideology. For example, Ingleby (2015) argues that at the centre of the neoliberal 
agenda shaping the educational context in the UK is a belief in competitive 
individualism and the maximisation of the market. Critics of neoliberalism (for 
example, Giroux, 2005) suggest the focus on economic outcomes results in 
unhelpful social, political, and cultural biases for educational activities. Further, 
Giroux and Giroux have argued that educators should build courses by combining 
‘democratic principles, values, and practices with... the histories and struggles of 
those often marginalized because of race, class, gender, disability, or age’ (2004: 
99). They argue that academics should shift beyond the lands of academia and 
integrate with the larger spheres in the community, where culture and politics are 
truly learned and made relevant. Thus if we continue to engage with performative 
enterprise practices and fail to recreate spaces and voices, universities will soon 
become sites of closure, where criticality and questioning are submerged in the 
quest for fast money and solid learning. It would seem that the focus on 
consumerism and competences is resulting not only in the erosion of critical 
pedagogy but also the marketization of values and the oppression of freedom 
(Mayo, 2013; Williams, 2013). 
There are still questions that remain about the the ideological underpinnings of 
digital immortality, since the search for such immortality is grounded in a human 
desire for control over life as well as death. Such a situation could be said to 
support and reinforce global neoliberal values, since it plays on the fears and hopes 
of humans whose lives have been about amassing personal resources they would 
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wish to retain beyond death. As academics we are, as Ball (2012) suggests, 
becoming calculable rather than memorable (p17). The result it would seem is that 
it is possible to see a resonance between the state of our neoliberal capital higher 
education system and digital immortality: both are focussed on the retention and 
management of knowledge and assets. Both seek competitive advantage and 
reinvention of themselves as a resource. Academics and digital immortals both 
have identities on tour, both seek to affect and manipulate market values. Yet 
perhaps as academics there is hope, if we can understand the powerful influences 
upon us and be responsible enough to fight against oppression and for freedom of 
speech.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper illustrates that a key concern for any form of digital immortality will be 
to maintain its own integrity. At the most basic level this will be to ensure that it 
has the hosting environment (public or private) on which to operate. Almost the 
whole raison d’être of a digital immortal is to be ‘immortal’, so ensuring that its 
code and data is preserved and runs will be a key concern. Again there is a 
considerable difference in approach between the creation of a digital immortal 
which is the hobby project of a programmer, and the digital immortality which is 
the legacy project of a high-net-worth individual, business leader or entrepreneur. 
In the latter case they have significant resources to call on, and as discussed earlier 
could set up a whole living human eco-system to ensure the preservation and 
continuing operation of the digital immortal. Perhaps much of what we are 
currently seeing is more of a ruse than a reality, and yet the only thing more 
chilling than digital immortality is in fact hacked digital immortality. 
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